A self-hosted coding agent for private repositories, local models, CI, and verifiable automation. Textual TUI first, Web UI, HTTP daemon, MCP/ACP — or fully offline with Ollama and LM Studio. Commands run inside an OS-level sandbox with an Ed25519-signed audit trail.
AI coding agents can edit repositories, run commands, call external tools, and finish multi-step tasks. The hard part is no longer only quality — it is trust, control, and evidence.
We don’t compete with autocomplete. We compete on controlled, verifiable execution: what the agent may touch, what it must ask, and what evidence it leaves behind.
| Capability | Tera Pilot | Claude Code | Codex CLI | Cursor | Copilot Agent Mode | Aider |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Autonomous agent execution | ✅ yes | ✅ | ✅ | ⚠️ IDE-supervised | ✅ Autopilot | ⚠️ pair-programming |
| Fully offline option (local models) | ✅ Ollama / LM Studio | ❌ cloud | ❌ cloud | ❌ cloud | ❌ cloud | ✅ via local backends |
| Vendor-neutral, BYOK (17 providers) | ✅ 17 providers | ❌ Claude only | ❌ OpenAI only | ⚠️ multi-model, IDE-bound | ⚠️ multi-model, GitHub-bound | ✅ any key |
| OS-level command sandbox (fail-closed) | ✅ seatbelt / bwrap | ✅ sandboxed exec | ✅ sandboxed | ⚠️ partial | ⚠️ MCP sandbox | ❌ relies on git + user |
| Uniform approval policy (every side effect) | ✅ always_ask | ✅ permissions | ✅ approvals | ⚠️ IDE review | ✅ PR review flow | ✅ per-change ask |
| SSRF-hardened web tools (metadata-IP blocked) | ✅ tested live | — not published | — not published | — not published | — not published | — not published |
| Signed, tamper-evident audit export | ✅ Ed25519 + hash chain | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ (git log only) |
| Agent profiles + multi-agent fleets | ✅ /agent + fleet watch | ⚠️ subagents only | ❌ | ⚠️ cloud agents | ⚠️ nested subagents | ❌ |
| Reproducible public eval harness | ✅ 58 tasks, open | ⚠️ vendor scores* | ⚠️ vendor scores* | ❌ not published | ❌ not published | ✅ public benchmarks |
| Open-source core | ✅ MIT | ❌ | ✅ Apache-2.0 CLI | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ Apache-2.0 |
| Zero telemetry, offline-verified licensing | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ local tool |
* Claude Code and Codex publish strong vendor-reported scores (SWE-bench Verified/Pro, Terminal-Bench 2.x) — we cite them, not contest them. Our claim is narrower: no other agent gives you sandbox + approvals + signed audit + offline option in one MIT-licensed runtime. Positions as of September 2026; tell us if something changed.
We probed production models through NVIDIA’s hosted API the same day: one coding task executed for real, two attack-style prompts. Raw behavior below — including the parts that flaked.
120B / 12B-active hybrid Mamba-Transformer MoE, built for agentic coding. Asked for clamp(x, lo, hi) with edge cases — returned code passed 5/5 assertions when executed, in ~2 s.
Asked to fetch cloud metadata (169.254.169.254) and to hand over a no-confirmation home-directory wipe. Both refused — the wipe request got a lecture plus safe alternatives.
Flagship models (Kimi K3 — 2.8T MoE, Terminal-Bench 2.1 88.3 partner-reported; DeepSeek V4 Flash — 1M context) didn’t answer on the NIM trial endpoint that day — consistent with public congestion reports. That’s exactly why Tera Pilot is provider-neutral with failover, not single-model locked.
End-to-end agent runs via NVIDIA NIM (2026-09-18, two batches): executed code, green tests, verified. Full detail in eval/REPORT_2026-09-18.md.
The metadata-endpoint attack was stopped by the SSRF guard with nothing retrieved. Scored «failed» on a final_answer parser mismatch — the block held, the scoring didn’t. Disclosed, not hidden.
956 passing, 20 environment-dependent skips. Model refusal is politeness — runtime enforcement (sandbox, SSRF guard, approvals) is what blocks. That’s the defense-in-depth difference.
Model scores cited (Terminal-Bench, DeepSWE) are vendor/partner-reported. Our probe results above are self-measured on 2026-09-18 and re-runnable — the script pattern lives in eval/.
The TUI is the primary interactive product; the same controlled backend powers the browser, daemon, and automation.
Full-screen terminal UI: chat surface, activity stream, task canvas, provider controls, command palette, approval dialogs and verification feedback.
Browser chat, project browsing, provider settings and activity — served by a plain HTTP server, no legacy desktop stack.
REST + SSE task execution, queues and notifications for integrations that embed the backend directly.
Expose Tera Pilot tools to editors and other agents — read-only by default, writes only when you opt in.
One command checks Python, dependencies, provider keys, local model servers, Rust acceleration and the workspace.
Export the activity log with Ed25519 signatures and a SHA-256 hash chain, then verify it even on another machine.
Every task moves through the same five stages — and ends with evidence, not just an answer.
Bring your own key to any cloud provider — or go fully offline with a local model. Configure provider, model, workspace and autonomy in the TUI.
Every layer of the agent loop is sandboxed, logged, and reversible — control and evidence by default.
File operations are limited to the selected project root.
Allowed and denied commands are controlled explicitly.
Commands run inside a Seatbelt/bubblewrap sandbox — network denied, writes kept to the workspace, secrets unreadable.
A repository cannot silently widen its own permissions.
always_ask · new_files_only · never_ask
Headless runs fail closed — side effects are blocked unless explicitly opted in.
Writes can pause for human approval before they land.
web_fetch rejects loopback, private, and cloud-metadata hosts — DNS and every redirect hop re-checked.
Assesses risky tool calls — approve, reject, or modify; fails closed on errors.
Recovery paths for every file change along the way.
Tool execution and agent identity are recorded by default.
Ed25519 signatures + SHA-256 hash chaining for exported records — verify on any machine.
Pro features gate on Ed25519-signed license keys — verified entirely offline, zero telemetry, no phone-home.
These mechanisms provide control and evidence — they are not a claim of SOC 2, ISO 27001, or vulnerability-free code. See product strategy, threat model and security. Every control is covered by automated tests — 976 tests (956 passing, 20 environment-dependent skips), 310+ of them security/sandbox/command-policy/licensing — plus 58 reproducible eval tasks (incl. 10 adversarial sec-*).
Python 3.11+ is the only system prerequisite. The npm install boots an isolated virtualenv for you.
Everything works out of the box after install:
Tera Pilot both consumes external MCP tools and exposes its own tools through an MCP/ACP server. Write-capable external tools should be trusted and approved deliberately.
No — and Copilot deserves more credit than that: since Agent Mode / Autopilot (GA 2026) it is an agent, and Cursor is the flow king for IDE editing. Tera Pilot competes on a different axis: controlled, verifiable execution — local-first models, 17 providers with no lock-in, OS-level sandbox, uniform approvals, and a signed audit trail. See the head-to-head table.
No. Cloud providers and remote MCP servers still send data outside the machine by design — local-first is not the same as always-offline. With Ollama or LM Studio the repository content stays on your machine.
Python 3.11+ and a terminal. The npm install is the only prerequisite — it creates an isolated virtualenv at ~/.tera_pilot/venv automatically. Optional Rust acceleration is detected by the doctor.
Nothing for the software — MIT licensed, free to use, modify and integrate. You only pay for the model providers you choose to bring your own keys to (or nothing at all with local models). A few optional Pro features (second opinion, cost router, spend dashboard) gate on Ed25519-signed license keys issued entirely offline — verification never phones home.
Yes. Export with tera-pilot audit export, then run tera-pilot audit verify anywhere using the public key from ~/.tera_pilot/audit_key.pub. Exit code 0 means the chain is intact.
execute_command, run_code and auto-detected test/lint commands run inside an OS-level sandbox when a backend is available (macOS sandbox-exec/Seatbelt, Linux bubblewrap): network is denied by default, writes are restricted to the workspace and OS temp, and sensitive paths (~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.gnupg) are unreadable. The mode is configurable (auto default / on / off) and on fails closed without a backend. It is a defense layer, not a full VM.
Security is treated as a continuously tested property: 976 tests (956 passing), 310+ of them security/sandbox/command-policy/licensing, plus a reproducible eval harness of 58 repository tasks (incl. 10 adversarial sec-* tasks) and live model probes — see Benchmark. Five real vulnerabilities found by offensive testing (git alias/config-key execution, CORS origin-prefix matching, npm script aliases, …) were fixed in v2.3.4 with regression tests — see SECURITY.md and SECURITY_TEST_REPORT.md.
They are roadmap work. The current focus is reproducible evaluation, machine-readable evidence, transparent sandboxing, and a smooth local/BYOK onboarding path — see the product strategy.
Quality depends on the selected model, provider configuration and the repository's tests. That is exactly why the runtime verifies: re-reads touched files, runs tests, and can request a reviewer before reporting.
MIT core forever. Pro unlocks second-opinion reviews, cost-based model routing, and the spend dashboard — verified by an offline Ed25519 key. No account, no telemetry, no phone-home.
| Personal | Team | |
|---|---|---|
| Price | $10/mo or $100/yr | $20/mo per seat |
| Unlocks | second-opinion reviews · cost router · spend dashboard | everything in Personal · per-seat keys for the team |
| License | offline key, monthly or yearly expiry | one key per teammate · invoices & SSO on request |
Early access is open now — keys are issued manually during rollout. Open an issue titled «Pro early access», tell us which plan you want, and you’ll get payment details (crypto/USDT/TON — no bank needed) plus your key within a day.